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Aboriginal Rights in Transition: 
Reassessing Aboriginal Title and 
Governance 
KENT McNEIL 
n the past five years, there have been some very significant political and I legal developments in relation to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. On 
1 April 1999, Nunavut emerged as a new territory in the central Arctic, under 
the defacto control of the Inuit residents who comprise about 85 percent of 
the population. The previous August, the Nisga’a Agreement was initialed 
in British Columbia after almost twenty-five years of negotiations. This is the 
first modem land-claims agreement to be signed in a province where most 
of the land is claimed by Aboriginal peoples by virtue of their Aboriginal title. 
On 7 January 1998, the Canadian government announced a new policy of 
reconciliation with the Aboriginal peoples, aimed at strengthening Aborigi- 
nal governance and economic development, and healing some of the wounds 
caused by the tragic legacy of the residential school system. This policy ini- 
tiative was in partial response to the massive five-volume Regort ofthe Royal 
Commission on Abmgid Peoples, released in the fall of 1996, that condemned 
Canada for its past treatment of the Aboriginal peoples and recommended a 
fundamental restructuring of the relationship based on principles of mutual 
recognition, respect, sharing, and responsibility. 
These political arrangements and policy initiatives have been 
matched by equally dramatic developments in the law of Aboriginal rights 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. In a series of important decisions, the 
Court has come to grips with a number of issues that it did its best to avoid 
in the past, involving the identification and definition of Aboriginal 
rights, the content of Aboriginal title to land and the requirements for 
proving it, and the relevance of the law of New France to Aboriginal rights 
today. This paper will focus on these recent developments in the law, as 
well as attempting to identify areas where the law of Aboriginal rights is 
incomplete and so requires further judicial elucidation. 
Constitutionalization of Aboriginal Rights and the “Integral to 
the Distinctive Culture’’ Test 
Prior to three decisions released by the Supreme Court in August 
of 1996, which are collectively known as the Van der Peet trilogy, there 
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318 McNeil 
were no clear legal guidelines for identifying and defining Aboriginal 
rights. Those rights were generally known to arise from the precolonial 
presence of Aboriginal societies in Canada and their occupation of lands 
but, prior to 1996, the Court had not laid down any rules for determin- 
ing which practices and traditions qualified for protection as Aboriginal 
rights and which did not. This matter became particularly important when 
Aboriginal rights were accorded constitutional protection (along with 
treaty rights, which will not be discussed in this paper) at the same time 
as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was introduced in 1982. 
This protection was provided by section 35( 1 )  of the Constitution Act, 
1982, which states that “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”’ The 
intention was to identify and define Aboriginal rights by political means 
and, possibly, by further constitutional amendment. But even though four 
constitutional conferences were held in the 1980s to accomplish this task, 
the talks foundered over the issue of Aboriginal self-government. As a 
result, identification and definition of Aboriginal rights were relegated to 
the legal forum of the courts by default.2 
The Supreme Court first considered the effect of the constitution- 
alization of Aboriginal rights in the Sparrow case, decided in 1990.3 In 
that case the right in question-the right of the Musqueam Nation in 
British Columbia to fish for food, societal, and ceremonial purposes-was 
accepted by the Court without the need to formulate a test for identifi- 
cation of Aboriginal rights generally. The Court focused instead on the 
issues of extinguishment and infringement of Aboriginal rights, holding 
that the rights constitutionalized in 1982 are those that were “existing” 
in the sense that they had not previously been extinguished by clear and 
plain legislation or treaty. The Court nonetheless decided that the con- 
stitutional protection provided in 1982 is not absolute-Aboriginal rights 
can still be infringed by legislation if the government can establish a valid 
legislative objective for the infringement that is substantial and compel- 
ling, and show that the government’s fiduciary obligations to the Aborigi- 
nal people in question have been respected by consulting with them, 
infringing their rights as little as possible in the circumstances, and pay- 
ing them compensation for any expropriation. This has become known 
as the Spurrow justification test. 
As Spurrow left open the issue of how Aboriginal rights are to be 
identified and defined, the Supreme Court was obliged to return to this 
question in 1996 in the Van der Peet, Gladstone, and N.T.C. Smokehouse 
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Reassessing Aboriginal Title and Governance 319 
cases (the Van der Peet trilogy).’ We will focus our discussion on the Van 
der Peet case, as it laid down the test for identifying and defining Aboriginal 
rights that was applied in the other two decisions. That case involved 
charges laid against Dorothy Van der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo Na- 
tion in British Columbia, for unlawfully selling ten salmon that had been 
caught under the authority of an Indian food fish license. In defense, she 
claimed an Aboriginal right to sell fish. 
The Chief Justice of Canada at the time, Antonio Lamer, wrote the 
majority judgment. In it, he created a test for identifying and defining Ab- 
original rights that is commonly referred to as the “integral to the distinc- 
tive culture” test. In Lamer’s words, “in order to be an aboriginal right an 
activity must be an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to 
the distinctive culture of the aboriginal group claiming the right.”5 More- 
over, the time for determining whether a practice, custom, or tradition 
meets this test is the time prior to contact between the Aboriginal people 
in question and the European colonizers. Practices, customs, and tradi- 
tions that arose as a result of contact do not qualify, as in Lamer’s view 
they are not “aboriginal.” In the case at hand, although the Sto:lo had 
traded with other Aboriginal nations and exchanged fish for other goods 
prior to European contact, Lamer found that exchange of salmon for 
money or other goods had not been an integral part of their distinctive 
culture. Dorothy Van der Peet therefore did not have an Aboriginal right 
to sell salmon, even in small quantities, as exchange of salmon had not 
been a defining feature of precontact Sto:lo society. Instead, it was inci- 
dental to the more primary activity of fishing for food and ceremonial 
purposes, and so was not sufficiently integral to their distinctive culture 
to be protected as an Aboriginal right. 
Lamer’s narrow, time-orientated approach to the identification and 
definition of Aboriginal rights has been severely criticized. The two 
women on the Supreme Court at the time, Justices McLachlin and 
L‘Heureux-Dubk, both wrote strong dissenting judgments. While accept- 
ing Lamer’s statement of the appropriate test quoted above, McLachlin 
disagreed with the meaning he attached to “integral.” For her, a practice 
is integral to an Aboriginal culture if it “is part of the unity of practices 
which together make up that culture. This suggests a very broad defini- 
tion: anything which can be said to be part of the aboriginal culture would 
qualify as an aboriginal right protected by the Constitution Act, 1982.”6 
She also thought that Lamer’s approach was too categorical, leading to 
an all-or-nothing result, and incorporated indeterminate subjective ele- 
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320 McNeil 
ments in identifying what is distinctive and central to a culture. She pre- 
ferred an “empirical historic approach” that would allow judges to iden- 
tify Aboriginal rights by asking: “Is this like the sort of thing which the 
law has recognized [as an Aboriginal right] in the past Y7 Her goals seem 
to have been to avoid rigidity, and to ensure that Aboriginal peoples, in 
keeping with their traditions and cultures, continue to have access to the 
resources necessary to sustain their distinctive societies. In keeping with 
these goals, she also rejected Lamer’s precontact time frame for identify- 
ing Aboriginal rights, suggesting instead that they should be based on 
traditional Aboriginal laws and customs whose roots, while historical, need 
not be traced to precontact times. 
Justice L‘Heureux-Dub6 was even more forceful in her dissent in Van 
der Peet. She characterized Chief Justice Lamer’s precontact requirement 
as a “frozen right” approach that is inconsistent with Aboriginal perspec- 
tives, arbitrary, and unfair because it places an overly onerous burden of 
proof on the Aboriginal peoples. She preferred a “dynamic right” approach 
that would allow for the evolution of Aboriginal rights over time so they 
would “maintain contemporary relevance in relation to the needs of the 
natives as their practices, traditions and customs change and evolve with the 
overall society in which they live.’” As long as a practice, custom, or tradi- 
tion was sufficiently fundamental to the Aboriginal culture in question “jim 
a substant ia l  cont inm period of tim”-which she suggested could range from 
twenty to fifty years-it would qualify for protection as an Aboriginal right? 
L‘Heureux-Dub6 also criticized Lamer’s narrow approach to the definition 
of Aboriginal rights. Instead of focusing on particular Aboriginal practices, 
traditions, and customs, as he did, she favored a generic approach that would 
define Aboriginal rights in a more general and abstract way. She wrote: “the 
aboriginal practices, traditions and customs which form the core of the lives 
of native people and which provide them with a way and means of living as 
an organized society will fall within the scope of the constitutional protec- 
tion unders.35( l).’”O Moreover, she viewed section 35( 1) more broadly as 
protecting the distinctive cultures of the Aboriginal peoples rather than par- 
ticular activities that are “manifestations” of those cultures: “Simply put, the 
emphasis would be on the signijicmce of these activities to natives rather than 
on the activities themselves.”” 
I t  was unclear from the Van der Peer decision whether Lamer’s “in- 
tegral to the distinctive culture” test would be applied to Aboriginal title 
to land. Commentators feared that it would, as the Chief Justice had writ- 
ten in his majority judgment that “aboriginal title is the aspect of aborigi- 
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Reassessing Abcrrigid Title and Governance 32 1 
nal rights related specifically to aboriginal claims to Iand.”l* Six weeks 
later, in the Adam and C6tk decisions from Quebec, he elaborated on this 
connection between Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights by hold- 
ing that Aboriginal rights, such as the fishing rights at issue in those cases, 
can exist independently of Aboriginal title.13 While those rights may be 
site-specific, they do not require the occupation and degree of use of land 
that is necessary to establish a claim to Aboriginal title. 
The Adams and C6tk decisions are significant for another reason as 
well. In both cases, Quebec argued that Aboriginal title to land could not 
exist in the province because the French law that had been in place be- 
fore the conquest of New France by Britain in 1759-60 did not recognize 
Aboriginal land rights. Chief Justice Lamer refused to accept this argu- 
ment. Even if the province’s interpretation of preconquest French law was 
correct (which Lamer found to be a matter of some doubt), he was un- 
willing to make the existence of Aboriginal title in various parts of Canada 
dependent upon which European power-France or Britain-happened 
to colonize an area first. If Quebec’s argument were adopted, he said, it 
“would create an awkward patchwork of constitutional protection for 
aboriginal rights across the nation, depending upon the historical idio- 
syncracies of colonization over particular regions of the He also 
found that it would risk “undermining the very purpose of section 35( 1) by 
perpetuating the historical injustice suffered by aboriginal peoples at the hands 
of colonizers who failed to respect the distinctive cultures of preexisting 
Aboriginal societies.”15 In this important respect, Adams and C6td affirmed 
an earlier Supreme Court decision that the law of Aboriginal title is part of 
the federal common law that applies throughout the country.16 
While the Adams and C6tk decisions indicated that the Supreme 
Court saw important distinctions between Aboriginal title and other 
Aboriginal rights, the relevance of the Van ckr Peet approach to Aborigi- 
nal title remained uncertain. lt was not at all clear whether the Court 
would apply the integral to the distinctive culture test in defining Aborigi- 
nal title. Resolution of this important issue had to await the Delgamuukw 
decision, handed down in December of 1997. 
Defining and Proving Aboriginal Title to  Land 
The significance of Aboriginal title in Canada cannot be overesti- 
mated. Unlike in the United States, where most Indian lands were ac- 
quired by conquest or treaty during the course of colonization and 
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322 McNeil 
westward expansion, in Canada conquest of the Aboriginal nations 
did not occur, and treaties involving land were limited for the most 
part to Ontario, the Prairie provinces, part of the Northwest Territo- 
ries, and smaller portions of British Columbia. As a result, when 
Aboriginal title to land was accepted as a legal right by the Supreme 
Court in the Culder case in 1973, over half the country was still sub- 
ject to Aboriginal title  claim^.'^ Since then, some of these claims have 
been dealt with by modern land-claims agreements, most recently by 
the Nunavut, Yukon, and Nisga’a agreements. But large areas-par- 
ticularly in the Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, and British Columbia- 
remain subject to these claims. In those areas in particular, Aboriginal 
title has very significant implications for land ownership and resource 
development. 
The issue of the content of Aboriginal title came squarely before the 
Supreme Court in the Delgumuukw case.18 That case involved claims by 
the Gitksan (also spelled Gitxsan) and Wet’suwet’en nations in north- 
western British Columbia to ownership and jurisdiction over their tradi- 
tional territories, an area almost as large as New Brunswick. The trial was 
the longest and most complex in Canadian history: it involved seventy- 
six witnesses, fifty-three affidavits, and 9,200 documents, and took 374 
days of court time. In a four-hundred-page judgment, Chief Justice 
McEachem of the British Columbia Supreme Court dismissed the claims, 
but that decision was appealed up to the Supreme Court of Canada, which 
reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, in part because McEachern 
had not dealt with the oral histories of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en in 
an appropriate way by according them the same kind of respect and weight 
that courts accord to written histories. 
While not coming to anydecision on the merits of the case, the 
Supreme Court did lay down a number of principles to guide trial judges 
in Aboriginal title cases. In addition to providing more scope for the use 
of oral histories, the Court defined Aboriginal title, explained what is 
necessary to prove it, clarified the extent of federal authority over it, and 
addressed the issues of constitutional protection and infringement. Apart 
from the use of oral histories, we will discuss each of these matters in turn, 
paying particular attention to the Court’s definition of Aboriginal title. 
Although the Court declined to deal with the claim to jurisdiction, which 
it characterized as a claim to self-government, we will nonetheless address 
this matter as well in the next section of this paper. 
Prior to the Delgumuukw decision, there was disagreement over 
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Reassessing Aboriginal Title and Gouemance 323 
whether Aboriginal title is equivalent to ownership of land and thus in- 
cludes natural resources such as timber and minerals, or is limited to the 
uses the particular Aboriginal nation made of the land in the past. Rely- 
ing on the Vun der Peet decision, the governments of Canada and British 
Columbia argued in Delgumuukw that Aboriginal title is limited to those 
past uses that meet the test of being “integral to the distinctive culture” 
of the claimants. The Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en, on the other hand, ar- 
gued that Aboriginal title, although inalienable except by surrender to the 
Crown, is otherwise tantamount to fee simple ownership. Chief Justice 
Lamer, who wrote the principal judgment, did not accept either of these 
positions. In addition to being inalienable, he found that Aboriginal title 
differs from fee simple ownership in a number of significant respects. First, 
it has its source in occupation of land prior to assertion of sovereignty by 
the British Crown, whereas fee simple title arises afterwards. Secondly, 
Aboriginal title has an inherent limit that prevents the land from being 
used in ways that are inconsistent with the attachment to the land that 
gave rise to it in the first place. Finally, Aboriginal title is a collective right 
that is held communally by all the members of an Aboriginal nation. 
Because of these distinctive features, Aboriginal title is unlike any other 
common law property interest-it is sui generis. 
Chief Justice Lamer nonetheless came down on the side of the 
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en on the vital issue of natural resources. Despite 
Aboriginal title’s special features, he said that it is “the right to the land 
itself,” which “encompasses the right to exclusive use and occupation of 
the land held pursuant to that title for a variety of purposes, which need 
not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions which 
are integral to distinctive aboriginal cultures.”1Y He went on to hold spe- 
cifically that Aboriginal title includes minerals, oil, and gas, even though 
exploitation of those resources might not have been a traditional use of 
the land. So the Van dpr Peet test does not apply to restrict the uses Ab- 
original peoples may make of their lands, though Lamer did say that the 
connection with the land upon which Aboriginal title is based has to be 
“of central significance to their distinctive culture”.20 He hastened to add, 
however, that this need not be an explicit element of the test for Aborigi- 
nal title, as occupation of land and maintenance of a substantial connec- 
tion with it would be sufficient in and of themselves to show that an 
Aboriginal nation’s relationship with the land was integral to its distinc- 
tive culture. 
This brings us to the matter of proof of Aboriginal title. Lamer said 
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324 McNeil 
that Aboriginal title can be established by proof that the Aboriginal people 
in question were in exclusive occupation of the claimed lands at the time 
of Crown assertion of sovereignty. Exclusive occupation is required, he 
said, because the Aboriginal title it gives rise to is exclusive. However, 
he also envisaged joint Aboriginal title where two or more Aboriginal 
nations shared exclusive occupation. Lamer chose assertion of sovereignty 
rather than contact as the appropriate time for proving the requisite oc- 
cupation because that is when Aboriginal title “arises out of prior occu- 
pation of land by the aboriginal peoples and out of the relationship 
between the common law and pre-existing systems of aboriginal law.”2’ 
It is a burden on the underlying title to land that the Crown acquires along 
with sovereignty, and so cannot predate sovereignty. In this respect, he 
distinguished Aboriginal title from other Aboriginal rights, which as we 
have seen must have precontact origins, because Aboriginal title depends 
simply on occupation of land, and so “does not raise the problem of dis- 
tinguishing between distinctive, integral aboriginal practices, customs and 
traditions and those influenced or introduced by European contact.’12z 
Also, he found the date of sovereignty to be more certain. 
Though Lamer spoke of Crown “assertion” of sovereignty, he must 
have meant “acquisition,” as that is when the Crown’s underlying title to 
lands would vest. But it is unclear whether he intended to limit this to 
acquisition of sovereignty by the British Crown, or meant to include the 
French Crown as well. In parts of Eastern Canada, the difference between 
these two dates could be as much as 150 years, during which time consid- 
erable movement of Aboriginal populations, and hence changes in occu- 
pation of lands, took place. Also, in many areas of Canada the date of 
acquisition of European sovereignty is at least as uncertain as the date of 
contact, as sovereignty involves murky legal questions as well as factual 
ones. Even more fundamentally, it might be asked why the onus is on 
Aboriginal peoples to prove their own title as against the European colo- 
nizers when we all know that they were here occupying lands when the 
newcomers arrived. 
In addition to defining Aboriginal title and explaining how it can 
be proven, in Delgarnuukw Chief Justice Lamer resolved an important is- 
sue concerning the division of powers between the federal and provincial 
governments. Under Canada’s original 1867 Constitution, the federal 
government was given exclusive jurisdiction over “Indians, and Lands 
reserved for the Indians.”23 However, it was unclear whether “Lands re- 
served” included Aboriginal title lands, or were limited to lands expressly 
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Reassessing Aboriginal Title and Governance 325 
reserved under the Royal Proclamation of 1763, treaties, or statutes such 
as the Indian Act. In Delgumuukw Lamer clarified this by deciding that 
Aboriginal title lands are indeed encompassed by the words “Lands re- 
served for the Indians.” But he went even further by ruling that all Ab- 
original rights, including Aboriginal title, are within the very core of this 
federal jurisdiction, which means that they are insulated from provincial 
laws by the constitutional doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity.24 As 
a result, Lamer held that ever since Confederation the provinces have 
lacked the authority to extinguish Aboriginal title. 
We have seen that Lamer described Aboriginal title as “the right to 
the land itself‘ and “the right to exclusive use and o~cupat ion .”~~ These 
descriptive phrases clearly reveal that, despite its sui gem’s  features, Ab- 
original title is proprietary in nature. It  therefore should be entitled to all 
the protection that English law, going back at least to Magna Carta in 
12 15, has traditionally accorded to property rights. Moreover, unlike other 
property rights in Canada, Aboriginal title is also constitutionally pro- 
tected as an Aboriginal right by section 35( 1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982. But despite these protections, when Lamer addressed the issue of 
infringement of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw he reached the startling 
conclusion that Aboriginal title may be justifiably infringed for a variety 
of purposes, including “the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, 
and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the inte- 
rior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered 
species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign popu- 
lations to support those aims.”26 Most of these purposes fall within pro- 
vincial jurisdiction, against which exclusive federal jurisdiction and the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, as we have seen, should protect 
Aboriginal title from infringement. But there is an even more fundamental 
reason to be disturbed by Lamer’s list of justifiable purposes. The devel- 
opment of agriculture, forestry, and mining, for example, require not just 
government regulation of Aboriginal title lands, but a taking of those lands 
(or at least of the resources on or under them). As this looks more like 
expropriation than infringement, one is left wondering how this kind of 
treatment of the constitutional rights of the Aboriginal peoples can be 
justified, especially if the governments doing the taking (the provinces) 
have no jurisdiction over Aboriginal title. Moreover, as the Chief Justice 
probably did not have in mind publicly owned farms, forestry operations, 
and mines in this context, he must have envisaged the taking of Aborigi- 
nal lands for private as well as public purposes. Government taking of 
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326 McNeil 
constitutionally protected property rights for the benefit of private inter- 
ests is a violation of fundamental principles. 
Lamer nonetheless tempered this governmental power over Aborigi- 
nal title lands by holding that consultation with the Aboriginal peoples 
affected has to take place before their rights are infringed. The degree of 
consultation depends on the extent of the infringement, and can amount 
to a need for outright consent where the infringement is especially seri- 
ous. Also, as he said the government will ordinarily have to pay fair com- 
pensation, infringement is not cost free. As the compensation payable may 
outweigh the value of the infringement to the government, this last re- 
quirement might act as an effective practical impediment to widespread 
government interference with Aboriginal title. 
In addition to Aboriginal title, the Delgumuukw case involved a 
claim by the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en to jurisdiction, or a right of self- 
government, over their territories. As mentioned above, Chief Justice 
Lamer declined to deal with this issue. He said: “The errors of fact made 
by the trial judge, and the resultant need for a new trial, make it impos- 
sible for this Court to determine whether the claim to Self-government 
has been made out. Moreover, this is not the right case for the Court to 
lay down the legal principles to guide further litigati~n.”’~ However, in my 
view a right of self-government is nonetheless implicit in the Delgumuukw 
decision. The next section of this paper will examine this issue. 
An Aboriginal Right of Self-Government 
So far the Supreme Court has dealt directly with a self-government 
claim only once, in the Pamajewon decision.28 That case involved a claim 
by the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations in Ontario that they have 
a right of self-government over their reserves that includes the right to 
regulate high-stakes gambling. Delivering the principal judgment, Chief 
Justice Lamer assumed, without deciding, that the Aboriginal rights pro- 
tected by section 35( 1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 include a right of 
self-government, but held that the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Na- 
tions had not established an Aboriginal right to engage in or regulate 
gambling. Applying the Van der Peet integral to the distinctive culture test, 
he found that, although the Ojibwa ancestors of these First Nations had 
gambled, that activity was not of central significance to their societies. 
Moreover, there was no evidence that they had regulated gambling. So 
their claim to self-government failed on the facts. The Pumajewon deci- 
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Reassessing Aboriginal T i t k  and Governance 327 
sion nonetheless left the door open for Aboriginal peoples to prove a right 
of self-government over activities that were integral to their distinctive 
cultures, if they could also establish that they had regulated those activi- 
ties prior to European contact. 
The Pamajewn decision has been criticized for, among other things, 
taking a narrow, fragmented approach to Aboriginal self-government. The 
Chief Justice refused to characterize the claim as being to “a broad right 
to manage the use of their reserve lands,” as the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake 
First Nations wanted the Court to do.*” That, Lamer said, would “cast the 
Court’s inquiry at a level of excessive generality.”’O He demanded greater 
specificity, thereby obliging Aboriginal peoples to prove their right of self- 
government on a piecemeal basis, activity by activity. Any possibility of 
establishing a broad right of self-government over their lands and peoples 
appeared to have been foreclosed by this decision. 
Sixteen months later, the Supreme Court decided Delgamuukw. As 
we have seen, it declined to deal with self-government then. But Chief 
Justice Lamer did make a very significant statement that has been taken 
to imply a right of self-government over Aboriginal title lands. After 
observing that Aboriginal title is held communally as “a collective right 
to land held by all members of an aboriginal nation,’’ he said this: “Deci- 
sions with respect to that land are also made by that c~mmunity.”~’ Now 
it is difficult to imagine how a community can make decisions about their 
land without some form of political organization that provides the means 
for collective decision-making. The communal nature of Aboriginal title, 
in and of itself, therefore seems to necessitate self-g~vernment.~~ More- 
over, as other Aboriginal rights, such as hunting and fishing rights, are 
generally just as communal as Aboriginal title, the same analysis should 
apply to them as well. So instead of attempting to prove a right of self- 
government directly, Aboriginal peoples may have more success estab- 
lishing other Aboriginal rights first, and then asserting that a right of 
self-government is entailed by the communal nature of those rights. 
Conclusions 
The beginning of the twenty-first century shows a lot of promise for 
the Aboriginal peoples of Canada. Advances made by them in the po- 
litical arena, starting with the entrenchment of their Aboriginal and treaty 
rights in the Constitution in 1982, have been matched by some solid vic- 
tories in Canada’s highest court. In what is undoubtedly its most signifi- 
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cant Aboriginal-rights decision to  date, the Supreme Court in 
Delgamuukw finally recognized that Aboriginal title to land includes a 
right to exclusive use and occupation that encompasses natural resources. 
Given the extent of unsettled Aboriginal title claims, especially in the 
Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, and British Columbia, the economic and 
political implications of this ruling are enormous. The issue of Aborigi- 
nal Self-government has also been simmering ever since the constitutional 
conferences of the 1980s, but outside of agreements such as those reached 
with the Inuit of Nunavut and the Nisga’a in British Columbia, it remains 
unresolved. Given, however, that a right of self-government probably 
underlies every other Aboriginal right, acknowledgement of its existence 
by the Supreme Court cannot be far off. 
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6. Ihid., para. 256. 
7. Ihid., para. 261 (emphasis in original). 
8. hid., para. 172. 
9. Ihid., para. 175 (emphasis in original). 
10. Ihid., para. 161. 
11. Ihid., para. 157 (emphasis in original). 
12. Ihid., para. 33. 
13. R. v. Adams, (19961 3 S.C.R. 101; R. v. C6te, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139. 
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17. Calder v. Attmney-General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
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20. Ihid., para. 150, quoting from R.  v. Adam, supra note 13, para. 26. 
21. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra note 18, para. 145. 
22. Ibid. 
23. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. (U.K.), c.3, s.91(24). 
24. Where it applies, this doctrine excludes the possihility of concurrent provin- 
cial jurisdiction. So where Ahoriginal rights are concerned, it should prevent provincial 
laws of general application from affecting those rights. 
25. See text accompanying note 19, supra. 
26. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra note 18, pra. 165. 
27. Ihid., para. 170. 
28. R. v. Pamajewon, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 164. 
29. Ihid., para. 27. 
30. Ihid. 
31. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, supra note 18, para. 11 5. 
32. For recent judicial acceptance of this argument, see Campbell v. British Cohmba, 
[2ooO] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.). 
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